A score 96 / 100strong, minor polish possible

Run 3 2026-11-06 01:33 UTC 57 checks profile 5 2.3 s unchanged since 2026-11-06 last checked 2026-11-06

netray.info

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Expiry ECH CORS CSP
Suites ECH CORS CSP
Suites ECH CORS CSP
DNS A+ TLS A HTTP A EMAIL A+ IP A+
Run 32026-11-06grade A

Run 3 · 2026-11-06 · grade A
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11-0610-28

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  • pass
  • warn
  • fail
  • fixed since run 2
57 checks · line height = weight in the grade

Since run 2

2026-11-01 · grade A+ → A

  • new Expiry window new · TLS·18 TLS·18

unchanged since 2026-11-06; last checked 2026-11-06

4 lines need attention

0 fail · 4 warn

Your certificate provider

1 line
warn TLS·18

warn · TLS·18 · lit up in run 3

Expiry window

lit up in run 3

130.162.45.139: leaf certificate expires in 30 days

Fix: Renew the certificate now and automate future renewals.

TLS · RFC 5280evidence →guide →

Your web server configuration

2 lines
warn HTTP·36

warn · HTTP·36 · in all 3 runs

CORS policy

in all 3 runs

Allows any origin (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *)

Fix: Allow only an explicit list of trusted origins and send Access-Control-Allow-Credentials only for those.

HTTP · WHATWG Fetch Standardevidence →guide →

warn HTTP·38

warn · HTTP·38 · in all 3 runs

Content Security Policy

in all 3 runs

style-src contains 'unsafe-inline'

Fix: Send an enforced Content-Security-Policy with default-src, object-src 'none' and base-uri that restricts scripts to trusted origins.

HTTP · W3C Content Security Policy Level 3evidence →guide →

Your DNS provider

1 line
warn TLS·33

warn · TLS·33 · in all 3 runs

ECH advertised

in all 3 runs

130.162.45.139: ECH not advertised in HTTPS DNS record

Fix: Publish the server's ECH configuration in the ech= parameter of the HTTPS record, once Encrypted Client Hello is enabled on the server.

TLS · draft-ietf-tls-esnievidence →guide →

Evidence

recorded with this run

Key records · 11 record types answered

TypeDataTTL
A130.162.45.139600
AAAA2603:c020:8023:6d00:0:c658:5b78:6699600
NSdns1.p04.nsone.net.600
NSdns2.p04.nsone.net.600
NSdns3.p04.nsone.net.600
NSdns4.p04.nsone.net.600
CAA0 iodef "mailto:hostmaster@netray.info"3600
CAA0 issue "letsencrypt.org"3600
CAA0 issuewild "letsencrypt.org"3600
DS48553 13 2 A643677CFFCBC4094D04B3C2ECDBEFB5D1B4CE4B09ED633666B9…3600

← swipe the table

Certificate chain · port 443 · 1 address, consistent

#SubjectIssuerKeyNot after
0netray.infoYR2RSA 40962026-12-06
1YR2Root YRRSA 20482028-09-02
2Root YRISRG Root X1RSA 40962032-09-02

← swipe the table

Response · 200 · h2 · https://netray.info/

HeaderValue
strict-transport-securitymax-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
content-security-policydefault-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'sha256-FBZufGszYN+NT1Qfw…
x-frame-optionsDENY
x-content-type-optionsnosniff
referrer-policystrict-origin-when-cross-origin
permissions-policycamera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=()

← swipe the table

Mail records · 1 MX host

RecordValue
MX10 smtp.google.com
SPFv=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
DMARCv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:hostmaster@netray.info; ruf=mail…
MTA-STSv=STSv1; id=20260408000000
TLS-RPTv=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:hostmaster@netray.info
DKIMgoogle: ok, rsa 2048
BIMIv=BIMI1; l=https://netray.info/bimi-logo.svg

← swipe the table

Addresses · 2 addresses

AddressASNOrgCountryNetworkListed
130.162.45.139AS31898Oracle CorporationGermanycloudnone
2603:c020:8023:6d00:0:c658:5b78:6699AS31898Oracle CorporationGermanydatacenternone

← swipe the table

This product includes GeoLite2 data created by MaxMind, available from https://www.maxmind.com.

53 lines clean · checks that passshow
pass DNS·01

pass · DNS·01

DNSSEC signed

The zone publishes DNSKEY records with a key-signing key, anchored by matching DS records at its parent. If it failed: Resolvers cannot detect forged or tampered answers for the domain.

DNS · RFC 4033evidence →guide →

pass DNS·02

pass · DNS·02

DNSKEY algorithm

None of the zone's DNSKEY records uses RSAMD5, DSA or an RSASHA1 algorithm. If it failed: Weak or deprecated algorithms are unsupported by validators or no longer considered safe.

DNS · RFC 8624evidence →guide →

pass DNS·03

pass · DNS·03

DNSSEC key rollover

The zone has a single key-signing key with a DS record at its parent, and every DS record matches one of its DNSKEY records. If it failed: A broken rollover can make validating resolvers reject every answer for the domain.

DNS · RFC 7583evidence →guide →

pass DNS·04

pass · DNS·04

CAA records

The CAA records that apply to the domain use only the issue, issuewild and iodef tags, with issuewild set wherever issue is. If it failed: Unrestricted or unclear CAA policy lets any public CA issue certificates, or wildcard certificates, for the domain.

DNS · RFC 8659evidence →guide →

pass DNS·05

pass · DNS·05

Nameserver redundancy

The zone lists at least two distinct nameservers in its NS records. If it failed: With a single nameserver, its outage takes the whole domain offline.

DNS · RFC 2182evidence →guide →

pass DNS·06

pass · DNS·06

Lame delegation

Every nameserver that answered the SOA query answered authoritatively for the zone. If it failed: Resolvers that pick the lame nameserver fail or time out, causing intermittent resolution errors.

DNS · RFC 1912evidence →guide →

pass DNS·07

pass · DNS·07

Delegation consistency

The NS set a recursive resolver returns matches the NS set the zone's own nameservers return. If it failed: Resolvers see different nameserver sets depending on which server they ask, which leads to inconsistent or failing resolution.

DNS · RFC 1034evidence →guide →

pass DNS·08

pass · DNS·08

No CNAME at apex

Where the checked name is a zone apex, it holds no CNAME record. If it failed: A CNAME at the apex conflicts with the SOA and NS records and breaks mail and other records.

DNS · RFC 1034evidence →guide →

pass DNS·09

pass · DNS·09

HTTPS record

The domain publishes HTTPS or SVCB records that keep alias and service mode apart and hold at most one alias record. If it failed: Clients cannot reliably learn HTTP/2, HTTP/3 or ECH support before connecting, which costs round trips.

DNS · RFC 9460evidence →guide →

pass DNS·10

pass · DNS·10

TTL range

No record has a nonzero TTL below 60 seconds, no NS or MX record has one above a week, and the SOA minimum is at most a day. If it failed: Very low TTLs load resolvers, while very high NS, MX or negative-caching TTLs delay the propagation of changes.

DNS · RFC 1912evidence →guide →

pass TLS·11

pass · TLS·11

TLS reachable

At least one address of the domain completes a TLS handshake on the inspected port. If it failed: Visitors cannot reach the site over HTTPS at all.

TLS · RFC 8446evidence →guide →

pass TLS·12

pass · TLS·12

Chain trusted

The served certificate chain verifies to a trusted root certificate. If it failed: Browsers show a security warning and block the site.

TLS · RFC 5280evidence →guide →

pass TLS·13

pass · TLS·13

Certificate valid

Every certificate in the served chain is within its validity period. If it failed: Browsers block access to the site until the certificate is replaced.

TLS · RFC 5280evidence →guide →

pass TLS·14

pass · TLS·14

Hostname match

The certificate's Subject Alternative Names cover the hostname. If it failed: Browsers reject the connection with a name mismatch error.

TLS · RFC 9525evidence →guide →

pass TLS·15

pass · TLS·15

Chain complete

The served chain is in issuing order and needs no missing intermediate to reach its root. If it failed: Clients that do not reorder the chain or fetch missing intermediates fail to validate the certificate.

TLS · RFC 8446evidence →guide →

pass TLS·16

pass · TLS·16

Strong signature

No certificate in the served chain below the root is signed with SHA-1, MD5 or MD2. If it failed: Weak signatures can be forged and are rejected by modern browsers.

TLS · CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirementsevidence →guide →

pass TLS·17

pass · TLS·17

Key strength

No certificate in the chain has an RSA key below 2048 bits or an ECDSA key below 256 bits. If it failed: Short keys can be broken and are refused by modern clients.

TLS · CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirementsevidence →guide →

pass TLS·19

pass · TLS·19

Certificate lifetime

The leaf certificate's validity period is at most 398 days, the browser maximum. If it failed: Major browsers reject publicly-trusted certificates issued with a longer lifetime.

TLS · CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirementsevidence →guide →

pass TLS·20

pass · TLS·20

SAN quality

The leaf certificate lists fewer than 100 Subject Alternative Names, none of them a single-label name or a private IPv4 address. If it failed: Internal names disclose private infrastructure, and very large SAN lists share one key across many sites.

TLS · RFC 9525evidence →guide →

pass TLS·22

pass · TLS·22

TLS version

The server negotiates TLS 1.3. If it failed: TLS 1.2 lacks the encrypted handshake and fixed safe cipher suites of TLS 1.3 and stays safe only with careful configuration.

TLS · RFC 8446evidence →guide →

pass TLS·23

pass · TLS·23

Forward secrecy

The negotiated cipher suite uses an ephemeral key exchange, so past sessions stay safe if the key is later compromised. If it failed: A later compromise of the private key exposes recorded past sessions.

TLS · RFC 9325evidence →guide →

pass TLS·24

pass · TLS·24

AEAD cipher

The negotiated cipher suite provides authenticated encryption (AEAD), such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305. If it failed: Legacy cipher modes are vulnerable to padding-oracle and related attacks.

TLS · RFC 9325evidence →guide →

pass TLS·25

pass · TLS·25

Legacy protocol versions

The server refuses SSLv3, TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1. If it failed: Deprecated protocol versions lack modern protections and let an attacker who can interfere with the connection exploit known weaknesses such as POODLE and BEAST.

TLS · RFC 8996evidence →guide →

pass TLS·26

pass · TLS·26

Weak cipher suites

The server accepts none of the probed insecure, CBC or static-RSA cipher suites. If it failed: Broken suites can be decrypted or forged; CBC suites are prone to padding-oracle attacks, and static RSA key exchange lets a later key compromise decrypt recorded traffic.

TLS · RFC 9325evidence →guide →

pass TLS·28

pass · TLS·28

CT logged

The certificate embeds at least two Signed Certificate Timestamps from Certificate Transparency logs. If it failed: Browsers that enforce a Certificate Transparency policy may reject certificates with too few SCTs.

TLS · RFC 6962evidence →guide →

pass TLS·29

pass · TLS·29

CAA compliant

No CAA record of the domain forbids the certificate authority that issued the certificate. If it failed: Issuance outside the CAA policy points to mis-issuance or a stale policy, and an unknown critical tag forbids every CA from issuing.

TLS · RFC 8659evidence →guide →

pass HTTP·34

pass · HTTP·34

HTTPS redirect

Plain HTTP requests on port 80 are redirected to HTTPS. If it failed: Visitors who type the bare domain get no upgrade to HTTPS and either fail to connect or stay on an unencrypted, tamperable connection.

HTTP · RFC 9110evidence →guide →

pass HTTP·35

pass · HTTP·35

HSTS

HTTPS responses carry a Strict-Transport-Security header with a max-age of at least one year. If it failed: Browsers may fall back to HTTP, which leaves visitors open to SSL stripping.

HTTP · RFC 6797evidence →guide →

pass HTTP·39

pass · HTTP·39

X-Frame-Options

Responses carry an X-Frame-Options header with the value DENY or SAMEORIGIN. If it failed: Other sites can embed the page in a frame, which enables clickjacking.

HTTP · RFC 7034evidence →guide →

pass HTTP·40

pass · HTTP·40

X-Content-Type-Options

Responses carry an X-Content-Type-Options header with the value nosniff. If it failed: Browsers may sniff content types and execute uploaded files as scripts.

HTTP · WHATWG Fetch Standardevidence →guide →

pass HTTP·41

pass · HTTP·41

Referrer-Policy

Responses carry a Referrer-Policy header whose effective policy sends no referrer from HTTPS pages to plain HTTP ones. If it failed: Permissive policies send the page's origin or full URL, including paths and query strings, to other sites.

HTTP · W3C Referrer Policyevidence →guide →

pass HTTP·42

pass · HTTP·42

Permissions-Policy

Responses carry a Permissions-Policy header. If it failed: Embedded content may use browser features such as camera or geolocation without restriction.

HTTP · W3C Permissions Policyevidence →guide →

pass HTTP·43

pass · HTTP·43

Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy

Responses carry a Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy of same-origin, same-origin-allow-popups or noopener-allow-popups. If it failed: Pages the site opens, or pages that open it, share a browsing context group with it and can reach its window object, which enables cross-window attacks such as XS-Leaks.

HTTP · HTML Living Standardevidence →guide →

pass HTTP·44

pass · HTTP·44

Deprecated headers

Responses carry none of the deprecated security headers X-XSS-Protection, Expect-CT and Public-Key-Pins. If it failed: Deprecated headers have no protective effect and some reintroduce vulnerabilities in old browsers.

HTTP · OWASP Secure Headers Projectevidence →guide →

pass HTTP·45

pass · HTTP·45

Information leakage

Responses carry none of the checked fingerprinting headers, such as Server, X-Powered-By and Via. If it failed: Software names and versions help attackers target known vulnerabilities.

HTTP · RFC 9110evidence →guide →

pass HTTP·46

pass · HTTP·46

Cache control

Responses carry a Cache-Control header that states how they may be cached. If it failed: Browsers and shared caches then fall back to their own heuristics and may serve stale content.

HTTP · RFC 9111evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·47

pass · MAIL·47

MX records

The domain's MX records point at mail hosts that are not CNAMEs, with no host found lacking an address. If it failed: Mail delivery breaks, or fails entirely when the single server or network is down. only one MX record, but it resolves to 4 IP addresses

Email · RFC 5321evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·48

pass · MAIL·48

SPF

The domain publishes a single SPF record within the DNS lookup limits, with no +all, ?all or ptr mechanism. If it failed: Others can send mail in the domain's name, and legitimate mail may be rejected.

Email · RFC 7208evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·49

pass · MAIL·49

DKIM

The DKIM keys found under the probed selectors are Ed25519 or RSA keys of at least 2048 bits. If it failed: Receivers treat signatures from short keys as weak or invalid, and without DKIM a strict DMARC policy rejects the domain's mail whenever SPF fails, such as after forwarding.

Email · RFC 6376evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·50

pass · MAIL·50

DMARC

The domain publishes one DMARC record with a reject policy and an aggregate report address. If it failed: Receivers are not told to reject spoofed mail claiming to come from the domain or its subdomains.

Email · RFC 7489evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·51

pass · MAIL·51

MTA-STS

The domain publishes an MTA-STS record and serves its policy over HTTPS in enforce mode. If it failed: Sending servers may deliver mail over unencrypted or downgraded SMTP connections.

Email · RFC 8461evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·52

pass · MAIL·52

TLS-RPT

The domain publishes a TLS-RPT record with a mailto: or https:// address for reports of failed encrypted mail delivery. If it failed: Delivery failures caused by MTA-STS or DANE problems go unnoticed.

Email · RFC 8460evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·53

pass · MAIL·53

BIMI

The domain's BIMI record points to an HTTPS logo that answers with success, and no DMARC policy weaker than quarantine was found. If it failed: Supporting mail clients do not show the brand logo next to the domain's mail.

Email · draft-brand-indicators-for-message-identificationevidence →guide →

pass MAIL·55

pass · MAIL·55

DNS blocklists

No blocklist zone that answered lists the domain or its MX addresses. If it failed: Receivers that consult the blocklist reject or quarantine the domain's mail. zen.spamhaus.org rejected the query (127.255.255.254); results from this zone are unreliable; zone bl.spamcop.net unreachable: timeout; dbl.spamhaus.org rejected the query (127.255.255.254); results from this zone are unreliable

Email · RFC 5782evidence →guide →

pass MAIL·56

pass · MAIL·56

Forward-confirmed rDNS

Every MX address whose reverse lookup answered has a PTR name that resolves back to it. If it failed: Many receivers reject or penalise mail from servers without forward-confirmed reverse DNS.

Email · RFC 1912evidence →guide →

pass IP·57

pass · IP·57

IP reputation

None of the domain's checked addresses is listed by Spamhaus or flagged as a Tor exit, command-and-control host or VPN endpoint. If it failed: Flagged addresses are blocked or throttled by mail receivers, firewalls and CDNs.

IP · RFC 5782evidence →guide →

untested TLS·21

untested · TLS·21

AIA reachable

TLS · RFC 5280

untested TLS·27

untested · TLS·27

OCSP stapling

TLS · RFC 6066

untested TLS·30

untested · TLS·30

DANE valid

TLS · RFC 6698

untested TLS·31

untested · TLS·31

Multi-IP consistency

TLS · RFC 9325

untested TLS·32

untested · TLS·32

ALPN consistency

TLS · RFC 7301

untested HTTP·37

untested · HTTP·37

Secure cookies

HTTP · RFC 6265

untested MAIL·54

untested · MAIL·54

SMTP DANE

Email · RFC 7672

Result page

The grade, the spectrum, the open issues and the evidence of the latest run of this domain. Copy or download the stored run from the Evidence section.

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